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1.0 Introduction 
 
Parliament will consider the Lokpal1 Bill this week. The debate on policy choices and the 
institutional design for a new anti-corruption agency at the Union and State levels has 
pervaded every public fora. The ubiquitous debate is characterized by passionate 
disagreement between familiar opponents who never tire of restating and rehashing their 
adopted positions informed by their moral or political commitments. Even by the standards 
of India’s loud and noisy democracy the anti-corruption debate has been characterized by 
rancour and extra-ordinary brinkmanship that threatens to derail India’s everyday practice 
of politics. 
 
Despite the polarized debate there is agreement on the core moral imperative to tackle 
corruption seriously. However, the debate has quickly moved from this agreed premise to 
the questionable conclusion that we need a powerful national institution to prosecute and 
convict the corrupt under the criminal law.  To our knowledge the choice of appropriate 
legal instruments to deal with corruption has not been debated. But the idea of an anti-
corruption agency is not a new one. It has survived the scrutiny of the National Commission 
to Review the Working of the Constitution (2000), two Administrative Reforms Commissions 
(1966 and 2005), four Parliamentary Standing Committees (1996, 1998, 2001, and 2011), 
and review of eight anti-corruption bills (1968, 1971, 1977, 1985, 1989, 1996, 1998, and 
2001). Half of the states and union territories have already legislated on, and constituted 
anti-corruption agencies. Orissa was the first state to legislate on this matter (1970),2 while 
Maharashtra was the first to constitute an anti-corruption agency (1972).3 These preceding 
policy debates and existing models in the states have framed our policy choices. But the 
debate so far has focused extensively on the constitutional status of Lokpal and the 
administrative and legal mechanisms necessary for a strong and effective Lokpal without 
any attempt to learn from an empirical analysis of the performance of existing institutional 
models. The best case for a national Lokpal is to show that the existing Lokayukta in the 
                                                          
1
 Dr. L. M. SInghvi coined the word Lokpal, which means ‘protector of the people’, to indigenize the word 
Ombudsman (Standing Committee 2011, para 3.3). 
2
 Orissa Government (n.d.). 
3
 Standing Committee (2011, para 3.8). 
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states works. For instance, it is often argued that the Karnataka Lokayukta, constituted 
under the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984, provides an argument for an anti-corruption 
agency at the national level. So, it is puzzling that the debate has referenced prior 
bureaucratic discourse and the National Crime Record Bureau statistics but there has been 
no systematic effort to evaluate or assess the experience of existing anti-corruption 
agencies in the states. The latest Parliamentary Standing Committee Report’s use of 
anecdotes as empirical evidence exemplifies this approach.4 
 
In this working paper we hope to bring new insights to this debate by engaging with law in 
action. Over the last six months, researchers at the Azim Premji University’s Law and 
Governance Initiative examined a comprehensive data set of all raid and trap cases handled 
by Karnataka’s Lokayukta between 1995 and 2011. This data was obtained under the Right 
to Information Act, 2005. While our final analysis and conclusions will follow shortly, we 
hope to contribute to the present debates with our preliminary findings through this 
working paper. Our analysis suggests that the policy debate on the Lokpal has focussed on 
issues that have been anticipated and largely resolved by existing legislation and 
institutional design of the Lokayukta in, say, Karnataka and has ignored critical issues that 
may have little or nothing to do with the design of the Lokpal itself but affect its 
performance. We conclude that a bill that does not assimilate the experience of existing 
anti-corruption agencies in states like Karnataka is doomed to fail. Rest of the discussion is 
organized around discrete themes that have been highlighted in the current Lokpal debate. 
 
2.0 Agency Prosecutions vs. Citizen Complaints 
 
The need to establish a strong Lokpal that initiates criminal investigation against corrupt 
officials has been a key demand in the current debate. The Karnataka Lokayukta had the 
power, under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to investigate cases of corruption and 
recently was endowed with suo motu powers even under the Karnataka Lokayukta Act to 
initiate criminal investigation.5 However, between 1995 and 2011, Karnataka’s Lokayukta 
                                                          
4
 Standing Committee (2011, passim). 
5
 Section 7(1)(b) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 as amended by the Karnataka Lokayukta (Amendment) 
Act, 2010. 
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carried out only 357 suo motu raids against individual officials but received and responded 
to over 2,159 complaints against 2,681 officials (and 59 private persons). In other words, for 
every six cases investigated in response to citizen complaints only one is initiated by the 
department suo motu. Also, the share of raid cases has been decreasing over the years. 
 
So, a comparison between raid and trap cases suggests one of the most active Lokayuktas is 
primarily private complaint driven. This in turn suggests that the legal power to initiate 
action does not determine whether we have a pro-active anti-corruption agency. The 
incentives for administrative action seem to lie elsewhere. Interestingly, institutional 
leadership is seen to have a significant impact on the agency’s performance. For instance, in 
Karnataka more than 66 % of the raid cases by the Lokayukta were initiated between 2006 
and 2011, when Justice Santosh Hegde was the Lokayukta. In this period the raids covered 
in our data were under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and hence the new powers 
conferred by the recent amendments to the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 that granted the 
Lokayukta suo motu powers to investigate cases are yet to have a significant impact on the 
institutional capacity for proactive intervention. 
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3.0 Departmental Distribution of Corruption 
 
There have been several estimates of the departmental distribution of corruption in India. 
These studies often rely on survey data of impressions of the public6 or from public 
disclosure websites.7 We carried out a department wise analysis of prosecution of 
corruption to map the focus of the Lokayukta’s work. 
 
                                                          
6
 See, for instance, Transparency International (2005). 
7
 See, for instance, iPaidaBribe.com (n.d.). 
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Interestingly, more than 80 % of the trap cases are related to four essential functions of 
government: local government (24.06 %), administration - Taluk/District office, Police, 
Court, Tax, Land, Revenue (37.65 %), welfare (17.61 %), and regulation (2.54 %). The rest of 
the cases are divided between agriculture and irrigation (3.76 %), forest (1.63 %), and 
economic activities (12.75 %). The corresponding departmental shares for raid cases are as 
follows: local government (18.21 %), administration - Taluk/District office, Police, Court, Tax, 
Land, Revenue (33.24 %), welfare (8.09 %), regulation (11.56 %), agriculture and irrigation 
(8.09 %), forest (3.47 %), and economic activities (17.34 %). Two observations are in order 
here. One, the distribution is not determined by the Lokayukta as a bulk of the cases arises 
out of citizen complaints. Two, given the growing importance of welfare function of the 
state the overall share of essential functions is likely to increase rather than decrease. 
 
Some participants in the debate have suggested that structural reform of government – the 
withdrawal of the state from non-core activities - will reduce corruption in India. Our 
preliminary analysis suggests that this is not a quick fix as at this stage, even a complete 
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withdrawal of the state from economic activities will have only a marginal impact on the 
level of corruption measured in terms of number of cases of corruption. So, tackling 
corruption may require a more fundamental restructuring of the administrative process as it 
is unlikely that reducing the size of government will have a significant impact on the levels of 
corruption. 
 
4.0 Petty vs. Grand Corruption 
 
The distinction between petty and grand corruption is a well-established one in the 
academic literature on corruption. It has emerged as one of the contentious issues in the 
Lokpal debate with respect to the inclusion of Group C and D officials within its jurisdiction. 
Though our data is yet to be organized in line with Groups A, B, C and D categorization it 
allows us to respond to this issue with greater insight than is currently the case. 
 
 
 
Nearly half of the officials against whom Karnataka Lokayukta has proceeded against are 
officials in the lower bureaucratic scale while about 10 % are senior officials. Only 24 
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officials out of 3038 (0.8 %) belong to the IAS, IPS, IFS, and KAS cadres. The upshot of this 
discussion is that there is little doubt that the case docket of a Lokpal that includes officers 
of all categories will be overwhelmed by cases against the lower bureaucracy. While the 
current debate seeks to emphasise the blameworthiness and legal culpability of petty and 
grand corruption equally, the institutional impact on the allocation of scarce prosecutorial 
resources will be a serious one. Further, it may be more useful to analyse the percentage of 
prosecuted officers from a particular category from among their total cadre strength but 
unfortunately this data is unavailable to us at this point. 
 
5.0 Process of Investigation: A stumbling block? 
 
The creation of a strong investigation and prosecution arm has been central to the Indian 
debate on the Lokpal. It is suggested that refusal of sanction for prosecution and the failure 
of the agency to complete investigations are the key problems that a Lokpal should be 
designed to avoid (see, for instance, the Jan Lokpal Bill, 2011). In Karnataka, our analysis 
leads to the conclusion that neither of these problems are critical hindrances for the anti-
corruption agency. 
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Of all the cases, in 65.9 (43.3) % of the trap (raid) cases sanction for prosecution was 
granted. But when seen as a function of investigated cases, the percentage of cases 
receiving sanction for prosecution goes up to 94.3 (90.5) % of trap (raid) cases. Further, the 
trap (raid) cases in which sanction is yet to be granted are on an average 1.63 (2.14) years 
old and the median case in this category is 2 (3) years old. We do not have further details 
about the cases in which sanction has not been obtained so far. So, we cannot say if the 
delay in these cases can be attributed to political and/or bureaucratic interference. 
However, we can say that almost all the raid cases in which sanction is pending involve 
senior officials, including IAS, IPS, and KAS cadre officials, and Chief Engineers. But in an 
overwhelming majority of the cases the need for sanction for prosecution has not operated 
as a significant hindrance to the functioning of the Lokayukta in Karnataka. 
 
The public debate has also emphasized the failure to complete investigations as one of the 
key problems to be resolved in the design of the Lokpal. We analysed the capacity of the 
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Karnataka Lokayukta to resolve this problem within their existing legal and bureaucratic 
framework. 
 
 
 
In 80.5 (54.4) % of the trap (raid) cases investigation has been completed and this does not 
vary significantly depending on the rank of official being investigated, except at the very 
highest level. This high investigation rate is particularly impressive. The trap (raid) cases 
pending investigation are on an average about 1.1 (2.14) years old and the median case in 
this category is one (two) year old. Similarly, charge sheets were filed in 97.1 (95.4) % of the 
trap (raid) cases in which investigations have been completed and sanction for prosecution 
has been obtained. This processing rate compares favourably with the rate at which criminal 
cases in general are processed in India. The success of the Karnataka Lokayukta in 
investigating cases suggests that the existing legislative and bureaucratic framework in 
Karnataka does not impede investigation of corruption offences. The Indian public debate 
on the Lokpal has focused extensively on the need to equip the institution with extra-
ordinary powers of investigation. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that much of the 
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Indian debate has sought to extinguish a problem that does not have a very significant 
impact on the effectiveness of anti-corruption agency. 
 
6.0 Criminal Trial: The Core Problem 
 
On the filing of a charge sheet in a special designated court, every case investigated by the 
Lokayukta enters the criminal justice system. We have noted that the performance of the 
Lokayukta in Karnataka has been creditable on most parameters discussed above. However, 
the story changes after charge sheets are filed. 
 
95.7 (96.6) % of the trap (raid) cases in which charge sheets have been filed are under trial. 
The average age of the trap (raid) cases under trial is 5.1 (8) years old and the median case 
in this category in 4 (6) years old. Further, of all the trap (raid) cases investigated and under 
trial only 15 (1) have resulted in convictions. The conviction rate of 20.5 (20) % in trap (raid) 
cases is much lower than the rate of convictions in criminal prosecutions in anti-corruption 
cases in India in recent years, which is between 34 and 40 % (NCRB 2007, 2008, 2009, Table 
9.1, Col. 23). This suggests that this is the key problem that lies at the core of a criminal 
conviction model for tackling corruption in India. The Indian debate on the Lokpal has 
focussed extensively on the remedying institutional inefficiencies at the complaint and 
investigation stage in the Lokpal. No matter how successful these innovations are, they will 
not tackle the core problem with a criminal trial in India: the trial stage. 
 
7.0 Is Karnataka’s Lokayukta a successful model? 
 
As the discussion above shows, if we use criminal conviction as the measure of success then 
the best Lokayukta in the country is undoubtedly a failure. But a caveat is in order: the 
Lokayukta does not administratively control the criminal court. Hence, we should attribute 
this failure to the choice of a criminal conviction model as the centrepiece of our anti-
corruption strategy. Alternatively, we may assess the performance of the Lokayukta by 
estimating its political and symbolic impact. While we do not have data to systematically 
evaluate the function of Karnataka Lokayukta, may be the Lokayukta’s capacity to occupy 
media attention through the spectacle of the raid and through high profile investigations 
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into politically charged cases that have unseated a Chief Minister, shifted the public mood 
and enhanced political accountability, could be counted as significant successes. However, 
we should not overstate these effects because the ruling party’s candidates have routinely 
won most by-elections to the Karnataka Legislative Assembly in the recent past. A third 
potential measure of success of the Lokayukta as an anti-corruption agency may be its 
capacity to initiate and affect administrative measures against officials, including recovery of 
damages. At this stage we do not have the data to estimate or assess these effects and this 
will be the emphasis for future research. A final assessment of the Lokayukta in Karnataka 
would need a more fully developed normative framework for assessment. However, even at 
this stage we may conclude that the Lokayukta fails to achieve its primary purpose: the 
criminal conviction of corrupt officials. 
 
8.0 Concluding Remarks 
 
The presumption of a criminal conviction model is at the core of the Lokpal Bill, which 
means that it will come up against the same environmental limits – the efficacy of the 
criminal justice system – that the Lokayukta in Karnataka confronts. Without highly 
contentious legal reforms, an extremely powerful agency, which the Jan Lokpal Bill promises 
to establish, can at best marginally improve investigation rates and filing of charge sheet in 
corruption cases without securing more convictions. The proposal for the Lokpal at the 
moment fails to address this core problem and for that reason is bound to fail to achieve its 
primary purpose: the criminal conviction of corrupt officials. 
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